A Step Forward or Just a Sidestep? Year Five of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Digital Age by Hasan, Nader R.




Volume 71 (2015) Article 17
A Step Forward or Just a Sidestep? Year Five of the
Supreme Court of Canada in the Digital Age
Nader R. Hasan
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Hasan, Nader R.. "A Step Forward or Just a Sidestep? Year Five of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Digital Age." The Supreme Court
Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 71. (2015).
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol71/iss1/17
A Step Forward or Just a Sidestep?  
Year Five of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the Digital Age 
Nader R. Hasan 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a cliché to write that computers and cell phones are ubiquitous.1 
These devices and the digital technologies that make them work have 
been a part of our lives for so long now that taking note of this fact seems 
as quaint as extolling the wonders of airplanes or pasteurization. These 
technologies are not new. 
The laws responding to digital technologies, however, are new — 
particularly as they relate to our privacy rights and the protections 
afforded under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.2 Over the past five years, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
issued a series of decisions meant to bring section 8 of the Charter into 
the Digital Age. These decisions acknowledged the unique privacy 
interests that people have in the information stored on their digital 
devices. In R. v. Morelli, the Court held that “[i]t is difficult to imagine a 
search more intrusive, extensive, or invasive of one’s privacy than the 
                                                                                                                                  
 Counsel, STOCKWOODS LLP (NaderH@stockwoods.ca). The author is grateful to 
Frederick Schumann, Annamaria Enanajor, Penelope Ng and the anonymous reviewers for their 
comments on an earlier draft of this article. The author also thanks Gerald Chan, who was  
co-counsel with him in their representation of the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association in  
R. v. Vu and R. v. Fearon, two of the cases discussed at length in this article. 
1 In this article, I refer to “computers”, “cell phones” and “digital devices”, but the 
distinction between these items is increasingly meaningless. See R. v. Fearon, [2014] S.C.J. No. 77, 
[2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, at para. 51 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fearon”]; see also R. v. Vu, [2013] S.C.J.  
No. 60, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657, at para. 38 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Vu (S.C.C.)”] (“Although historically 
cellular telephones were far more restricted than computers in terms of the amount and kind of 
information that they could store, present day phones have capacities that are, for our purposes, 
equivalent to those of computers.”). 
2 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”], s. 8. 
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search and seizure of a personal computer.”3 In R. v. Cole, it held that 
because of the “highly revealing” and “meaningful information” about an 
individual’s personal life that is stored on a computer, we enjoy a 
reasonable expectation of privacy even on work-issued computers that do 
not belong to us.4 In R. v. TELUS Communications Co., a plurality of the 
Court declared that “[t]echnical differences inherent in new technology 
should not determine the scope of protection afforded to private 
communications”, and held that the Criminal Code’s wiretap authorization 
provisions apply to the prospective interception of text messages.5 In Vu, 
the Court held that a search warrant may only be relied on to search the 
contents of a computer where the warrant specifically authorizes a 
computer search; a warrant that only authorizes the search of a residence 
in which a computer happens to be found is inadequate.6 In R. v. Spencer, 
the Court held that section 8 protects a right to online anonymity.7 And 
most recently, in Fearon, the Court established a framework for 
regulating warrantless searches of cell phones under the search-incident-
to-arrest exception.8 
In each of these decisions, the Court acknowledged that digital 
technologies have fundamentally changed the game, and that the 
prophylactic rules that protect our privacy rights from the State must 
evolve to keep pace. Through these judgments, the Court demonstrated 
an awareness of how these technologies work. It has also taken note of 
their potential to eviscerate privacy if law enforcement is simply 
permitted to apply the old Analog World rules in a Digital Age.  
While the Court has recognized the unprecedented challenge to 
privacy posed by the search and seizure of digital devices, it has stopped 
short of creating bright-line rules to protect our privacy rights. In Vu, 
despite the urging of civil liberties groups, the Court declined to impose a 
constitutional requirement that computer search warrants include “search 
protocols” to limit the invasiveness of a computer search. This leaves  
 
                                                                                                                                  
3 R. v. Morelli, [2010] S.C.J. No. 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, at para. 2 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Morelli”]. 
4 R. v. Cole, [2012] S.C.J. No. 53, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, at paras. 39-58 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Cole”]. 
5 R. v. TELUS Communications Co., [2013] S.C.J. No. 16, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 5, 
43-45 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “TELUS”]. 
6 Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at paras. 3, 22. 
7 R. v. Spencer, [2014] S.C.J. No. 43, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212, at para. 47 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Spencer”]. 
8 Fearon, supra, note 1, at paras. 82-83. 
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open the possibility that, once police are armed with a computer warrant, 
they can conduct a dragnet search into our entire digital lives — 
consisting potentially of millions of photographs, videos, e-mails, diaries 
and private medical and banking documents. And in Fearon — despite 
acknowledging that a cell phone is a miniature computer containing a 
treasure trove of personal information about an individual — a majority 
of the Court held that the police had a limited right to conduct 
warrantless searches of a cell phone as a search incident to arrest.  
The cynical way to read Vu and Fearon is that privacy matters but 
only to the extent that it does not fetter law enforcement, which is to say, 
it does not matter at all. Constitutional rights are meaningful only if they 
limit State power. If these six decisions on digital search and seizure have 
not succeeded in requiring more of law enforcement where our core privacy 
rights are at stake, they have not succeeded in protecting privacy at all.  
The less cynical way to read these cases is that the law of digital search 
and seizure remains a work in progress. The task for lawyers and the trial 
courts will be to reconcile the Supreme Court’s pro-privacy language with 
the actual holdings in Vu and Fearon. That task is the goal of this article.  
I suggest that the apparent tension between the Court’s pro-privacy 
language and the holdings in Vu and Fearon can be reconciled by insisting 
on rigorous ex post review of police searches of computers and cell phones. 
While the Supreme Court in Vu did not impose a requirement of “search 
protocols” as a constitutional imperative in all cases, I suggest that in many 
cases the only way to achieve the appropriate balance between law 
enforcement needs and privacy rights is for issuing justices to impose a set 
of search protocols that constrain and limit the scope of the computer 
search. In the context of searches of cell phones incident to arrest, I suggest 
that the only way to achieve meaningful after-the-fact review is to require 
that police electronically record all warrantless cell phone searches. 
Part 1 of this article will summarize the key lessons from the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s six digital-search-and-seizure decisions from 
2010 to 2014. Part 2 will focus on two of the most recent of those 
decisions, Vu and Fearon, and explain the apparent tension that exists 
between the pro-privacy language in Morelli, Cole, TELUS, Vu and 
Spencer and the actual holdings in Vu and Fearon. Part 3 will suggest 
that the only way to reconcile this tension is to insist on rigorous manner-
of-search review, including a requirement of search protocols in the case 
of warranted searches, and a requirement that police video-record all 
warrantless cell phone searches.  
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1. Supreme Court of Canada Jurisprudence on Digital  
Search and Seizure 
(a) Morelli (2010) and Cole (2011) 
Morelli marked a technological awakening of the Supreme Court of 
Canada. The Court, for the first time, turned its mind to the highly intrusive 
nature of a search of one’s personal computer. In Morelli, a computer 
technician had arrived at the accused’s house to install a high-speed Internet 
connection. He noticed, among other things, Internet links to adult and child 
pornography in the browser taskbar’s favourites list. The technician 
contacted a social worker, who informed the RCMP, which subsequently 
obtained a warrant to search the accused’s computer. The ensuing search 
revealed evidence of child pornography. The Supreme Court held that the 
search violated section 8 of the Charter. The warrant should not have issued 
because statements contained in the ITO were misleading and erroneous.  
The important part of the judgment for the purposes of this article, 
however, is the Court’s analysis under section 24(2) of the Charter. The 
Court excluded the improperly obtained evidence under section 24(2) 
because of the highly invasive nature of a search of one’s personal 
computer. Justice Fish wrote:  
It is difficult to imagine a search more intrusive, extensive, or invasive 
of one’s privacy than the search and seizure of a personal computer.  
First, police officers enter your home, take possession of your computer, 
and carry it off for examination in a place unknown and inaccessible to 
you. There, without supervision or constraint, they scour the entire 
contents of your hard drive: your emails sent and received; accompanying 
attachments; your personal notes and correspondence; your meetings and 
appointments; your medical and financial records; and all other saved 
documents that you have downloaded, copied, scanned, or created. The 
police scrutinize as well the electronic roadmap of your cybernetic 
peregrinations, where you have been and what you appear to have seen on 
the Internet — generally by design, but sometimes by accident. 
..... 
Computers often contain our most intimate correspondence. They 
contain the details of our financial, medical, and personal situations. 
They even reveal our specific interests, likes, and propensities, 
recording in the browsing history and cache files the information we 
seek out and read, watch, or listen to on the Internet.  
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It is therefore difficult to conceive a s. 8 breach with a greater impact 
on the Charter-protected privacy interests of the accused than occurred 
in this case.9 
The logic of Morelli drove the analysis in the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent computer-privacy decisions. In Cole, the accused, a high 
school teacher, was permitted to use his work-issued and school board-
owned laptop for incidental personal purposes. He browsed the Internet 
and stored personal information on his hard-drive. When a school 
technician found a hidden folder containing nude photographs of a 
female student on the accused’s computer, he notified the principal. The 
principal copied the photographs onto a CD and seized the laptop, both 
of which were handed over to the police, who, without a warrant, 
reviewed their contents and created a mirror image of the hard drive for 
forensic purposes. The accused did not own the computer hardware but 
he did own the personal and private information stored on it — private 
information that “falls at the very heart of the ‘biographical core’ 
protected by s. 8 of the Charter”.10 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held 
that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his work-
issued computer, and that the warrantless search of the computer had 
violated section 8. 
(b) TELUS (2013) 
The Court was confronted with a different technology-based 
challenge in TELUS, but like Morelli and Cole, the new realities created 
by digital technologies drove the Court’s analysis. The police in TELUS 
obtained a general warrant and related assistance order under  
sections 487.01 and 487.02 of the Criminal Code,11 requiring Telus to 
provide the police with copies of any stored text messages sent or 
received by two Telus subscribers. Telus applied to quash the general 
warrant arguing that the prospective, daily acquisition of text messages 
from their computer database constituted an interception of private 
communications and therefore required authorization under the wiretap 
authorization provisions in Part VI of the Criminal Code. 
                                                                                                                                  
9 Morelli, supra, note 3, at paras. 2-3, 105-106. 
10 Cole, supra, note 4, at para. 48. 
11 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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Part VI of the Criminal Code is Parliament’s response to the dangers 
of allowing the State unfettered discretion to listen to and record our 
private telephone conversations. The need to prevent unnecessary state 
intrusions into our private lives is essential not just for privacy, but also 
for expressive freedom. As Harlan J. famously noted, “Were third-party 
bugging a prevalent practice, it might well smother that spontaneity — 
reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious, and defiant discourse — 
that liberates daily life.”12  
These dangers moved Parliament in 1974 to enact what is now Part VI 
of the Criminal Code. The purpose of Part VI is to provide a “higher 
degree of protection … for private communications”.13 Its requirements 
are stricter than those of the other warrant provisions in the Criminal 
Code to reflect the heightened privacy interests at stake.14 For example, 
unlike any other warrant provisions in the Criminal Code, a Part VI 
authorization can only be obtained where the judge is satisfied under 
section 186(1)(b) “that other investigative procedures have been tried 
and have failed, other investigative procedures are unlikely to succeed or 
the urgency of the matter is such that it would be impractical to carry out 
the investigation of the offence using only other investigative 
procedures” (i.e., investigative necessity).15  
The issue in TELUS was whether Part VI — traditionally concerned 
with interception of telephonic voice communications — applied to the 
prospective acquisition of cell phone text messages. Taking a purposive 
approach, the plurality held that Part VI applied to the prospective 
acquisition of text messages. “Text messaging”, wrote Abella J., “is, in 
essence, an electronic conversation. The only practical difference 
between text messaging and the traditional voice communications is the 
transmission process”.16  
The plurality’s purposive approach was supported by the broad 
definition of “intercept” in the Criminal Code, which was not limited to 
traditional wiretapping (involving “bugging” a telephone line and 
                                                                                                                                  
12 United States v. White, 91 S. Ct. 1122, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), at 787-89 [hereinafter 
“White”], as quoted in R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 54 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Duarte”]. 
13 TELUS, supra, note 5, at para. 31, per Abella J. 
14 Id., at para. 27, per Abella J. 
15 Criminal Code, supra, note 11, s. 186(1)(b). It should be noted that under s. 186(1.1) 
there are exceptions to the “investigative necessity” requirement where the wiretap relates to 
criminal organizations or terrorism offences. 
16 TELUS, supra, note 5, at para. 5. 
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listening to the conversation), but was defined to include, “listen to, 
record or acquire a communication or acquire the substance, meaning or 
purport thereof”17 — terms that could apply equally to the acquisition of 
text messages. Accordingly, the plurality concluded, Part VI should apply 
to the prospective acquisition of text messages.18 “Technical differences 
inherent in new technology should not determine the scope of protection 
afforded to private communications.”19 
(c) R. v. Vu (2013) 
The Court in Vu picked up where it left off in Morelli and Cole. The 
accused was charged with several drug-related offences, including theft 
of electricity. The police obtained a warrant authorizing the search of a 
residence for evidence of theft of electricity, including documentation 
identifying the owners and/or occupants of the residence. The 
Information to Obtain a Search Warrant (“ITO”) indicated that the police 
intended to search for, among other things, “computer generated notes”, 
but the warrant did not specifically authorize the search of computers. In 
the course of their search of the residence, police discovered two 
computers and a cellular telephone, which they searched without 
obtaining a new warrant. These searches led to evidence that Vu was the 
occupant of the residence.20  
At trial, the accused claimed that these searches violated his rights 
under section 8 of the Charter because the search warrant did not 
specifically authorize the police to search the computers or the cellular 
phone. The trial judge accepted this argument and excluded most of the 
evidence found as a result of these searches and acquitted the accused of 
the drug charges.21 
                                                                                                                                  
17 Criminal Code, supra, note 11, s. 183. 
18 While the issue in TELUS concerned the applicability of Part VI to prospective 
interception of text messages (i.e., ex ante authorization to intercept a future message), the reasoning 
in TELUS also supports an argument that Part VI should apply to the retroactive interception of text 
messages and e-mails (i.e., any search of private electronic communications) on a cell phone or 
computer. See Factum of the BCCLA, Fearon v. Her Majesty the Queen, SCC Case No. 35298, online: 
<http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/35298/FM060_Intervener_British- 
Columbia- Civil-Liberties-Association.pdf>. That discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this article. 
19 TELUS, supra, note 5, at para. 5. 
20 Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 4. 
21 R. v. Vu, [2010] B.C.J. No. 1777, 218 C.R.R. (2d) 98, at paras. 60-69 (B.C.S.C.). 
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The British Columbia Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and 
ordered a new trial. It held that a computer was no different than “a four-
drawer filing cabinet” when it came to search and seizure law.22 The 
general rule when it came to physical objects, according to the Court of 
Appeal, is that a warrant authorizing a search of a specific location for 
specific things confers on those executing that warrant the authority to 
conduct a reasonable examination of anything at that location within 
which the specified things might be found. “Just as it cannot be said that 
a warrant to search for documentary evidence relating to a fraudulent 
scheme would not apply to a four-drawer filing cabinet …”, the B.C. 
Court of Appeal wrote, “neither can it be said that such a warrant would 
not apply to a computer, the existence of which the police learn of after 
entering a residence”.23  
The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed. Its decision in Vu lays to 
rest the quaint notion that computers are no different from physical-
world receptacles like filing cabinets, drawers and briefcases. It held 
that the police violated Vu’s rights against unreasonable search and 
seizure under section 8 of the Charter when they searched the three 
electronic devices found on the premises. It rejected the B.C. Court of 
Appeal’s holding that a computer is no different from a physical 
container. “Computers differ in important ways from the receptacles 
governed by the traditional framework,” wrote Cromwell J. for a 
unanimous Court, “and computer searches give rise to particular 
privacy concerns that are not sufficiently addressed by that approach”.24 
Specific, prior authorization to search a computer was necessary to 
comply with section 8 of the Charter.  
The outcome in Vu is not surprising. The writing had been on the 
touch-screen since Morelli.25 Nevertheless, before Vu, the approach of 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal had been accepted by learned trial 
and appellate courts across the country, which routinely compared 
computers to containers, briefcases,26 “sealed box[es]”,27 “logbook[s], 
                                                                                                                                  
22 R. v. Vu, [2011] B.C.J. No. 2487, 250 C.R.R. (2d) 108, at para. 63 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter 
“Vu (B.C.C.A.)”]. 
23 Id. 
24 Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 2. 
25 Morelli, supra, note 3, at paras. 2, 105 (“[I]t is difficult to imagine a more intrusive 
invasion of privacy than the search of one’s home and personal computer”.) 
26 R. v. Polius, [2009] O.J. No. 3074, 196 C.R.R. (2d) 288, at para. 47 (Ont. S.C.J.)  
(“[a] cell phone is the functional equivalent of a locked briefcase …”). 
27 R. v. Burchell, [2011] O.J. No. 4723, 246 C.R.R. (2d) 74, at para. 55 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
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diar[ies] or notebook[s]”,28 and “four-drawer filing cabinets”.29 Vu rejected 
these analogies and held what was implied but not explicitly stated in 
Morelli and Cole: that the old rules that protected privacy in an Analog 
World are insufficient in the Digital Age. Modern computers, cell phones and 
personal digital assistants are not analogous to the traditional “receptacles” 
found in the course of search and seizure.30  
What makes computers and computer technology so different? The 
Court in Vu catalogued a number of important ways in which computers 
are qualitatively different from physical world receptacles and explained 
how these unique features affect digital privacy.  
First, the quantity of the information stored on computers is unlike 
anything in the physical world.31 For less than $100, anyone can 
purchase a computer hard drive with storage capacity of 1 terabyte 
(1,000 GB),32 which is roughly equivalent to 500 million pages of text — 
or about the amount of information contained in all of the books on  
12 floors of an academic library.33 Given this “massive storage capacity”, 
the Supreme Court noted, there is a significant difference between the 
search of a computer and the search of a briefcase or filing cabinet found 
in the same location.34 
Second, the type of information stored on a computer is often 
intimate and private, thereby “fall[ing] at the very heart of the 
‘biographical core’ protected by s. 8 of the Charter”.35 As the Court 
previously noted, virtually every aspect of one’s private life is  
 
                                                                                                                                  
28 R. v. Giles, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2918, 2007 BCSC 1147, at para. 56 (B.C.S.C.). 
29 Vu (B.C.C.A.), supra, note 22, at para. 63. 
30 Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 24 (“The privacy interests implicated by computer 
searches are markedly different from those at stake in searches of receptacles such as cupboards and 
filing cabinets.”). 
31 Id. (“Computers potentially give police access to vast amounts of information that users 
cannot control, that they may not even be aware of or may have chosen to discard and which may 
not be, in any meaningful sense, located in the place of the search.”) 
32 See Best Buy Canada, online: Bestbuy.ca <http://www.bestbuy.ca/Search/SearchResults. 
aspx?path=ca77b9b4beca91fe414314b86bb581f8en20&query=hard+drive+external> (last visited 
October 26, 2015); “Hard Drives”, online: PC Mag.com <http://www.pcmag.com/reviews/hard-
drives> (last visited October 2, 2015). 
33 Orin S. Kerr, “Searches and Seizures in a Digital World” (2006) 119 Harv. L. Rev. 531 
[hereinafter “Kerr”], at 542; see also Marc Palumbo, “How Safe Is Your Data?: Conceptualizing 
Hard Drives Under the Fourth Amendment” (2009) 36 Fordham Urb. L.J. 977 [hereinafter 
“Palumbo”], at 995. 
34 Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 41. 
35 Id., at para. 40; Cole, supra, note 4, at para. 48 (S.C.C.). 
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consolidated into one’s computer, including “our most intimate 
correspondence”, “details of our financial, medical, and personal 
situations”, and “our specific interests, likes, and propensities” as 
revealed through the records of what we “seek out and read, watch, or 
listen to on the Internet”.36 People today use computers as photo albums, 
stereos, telephones, desktops, filing cabinets, waste paper baskets, 
televisions, postal services, playgrounds, jukeboxes, dating services, 
movie theaters, shopping malls, personal secretaries, virtual diaries and 
more.37 Your computer may reveal to the world more about you than 
your spouse, family members or close friends ever could.  
Third, the computer is a “fastidious record keeper”.38 Computers 
contain information that is automatically generated, often unbeknownst 
to the user. This computer-generated “meta-data” tracks information 
about who created a document on what date or who visited a given 
website at a particular time. It can reveal significant private information 
about the user’s interests, habits and identity.39  
Fourth, a computer retains files and data even after users think they 
have destroyed them.40 When a user “deletes” a file, the operating system 
simply marks the disk clusters occupied by that particular file as 
available for future use by other files. If the operating system does not 
reuse that cluster for another file by the time the computer is searched, 
the file marked for deletion will be available for forensic examination.41 
Even if another file has been assigned to that cluster, a large amount of 
that data can be forensically recovered from the computer’s “slack 
space”, i.e., space within the cluster left temporarily unused.42 In an era 
where hard drive data storage now exceeds multiple terabytes, this means  
 
                                                                                                                                  
36 Morelli, supra, note 3, at paras. 3, 105; Cole, supra, note 4, at para. 47. 
37 Kerr, supra, note 33, at 569. See also Lesley Ciaruula Taylor, “The astonishing amount 
of personal data police can extract from your smartphone” (February 27, 2013), The Star.com, 
online: <www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/02/27/the_astonishing_amount_of_personal_ data_police_ 
can_extract_from_your_smartphone.print.html> (where a police search of a smart phone revealed 
104 call logs, eight passwords, 422 text messages, six wireless networks, and 10,149 files of audio, 
pictures, text and videos — 378 of which were deleted). 
38 Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 42. 
39 Id. 
40 Id., at para. 43. 
41 Edward T.M. Garland & Donald F. Samuel, “The Fourth Amendment and Computers:  
Is a Computer Just Another Container or Are New Rules Required to Reflect New Technologies?” 
(2009) 10 Ga. B.J. 14, at 16; Kerr, supra, note 33, at 542; R. v. Little, [2009] O.J. No. 3278, at para. 96 
(Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Little”]. 
42 Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 43 (citing Kerr, supra, note 33, at 542). 
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that many of us unwittingly retain massive amounts of data we attempted 
to delete. Your computer’s “delete” key thus is more appropriately 
described as the “hide” button — it hides files from the casual user but 
preserves them for the future forensic examiner.  
Finally, a computer is rarely a stand-alone, self-contained entity.  
A computer that is connected to a network or to the Internet is a portal to 
a world exponentially larger than the computer itself.43 A search of a 
computer for which the police have lawful authority to access will 
potentially give police access to other users’ information stored on other 
devices and for which the police have no lawful authority to search. 
These unique factors “call for distinctive treatment under s. 8 of the 
Charter”.44 The old bricks-and-mortar approach to section 8 cannot be 
applied haphazardly to computers. The “markedly different” privacy 
interests flowing from computers call for a rule requiring specific, prior 
authorization before the police can search a computer.45  
(d) R. v. Spencer (2014) 
Whereas Morelli, Cole, TELUS and Vu concerned privacy in data 
stored on digital devices, Spencer concerned privacy in one’s virtual life. 
In Spencer, an officer of the Saskatoon Police Service was engaged in a 
child pornography investigation. Using the publicly available Limewire 
file-sharing software, he searched for users sharing child pornography. 
Limewire also permitted him to see the Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses 
associated with each user. He ran a list of IP addresses against a database 
with approximate locations and found that one of the IP addresses had an 
approximate location of Saskatoon, with Shaw Communications Inc. 
(“Shaw”) as the Internet Service Provider.46  
What he lacked, however, was a precise knowledge of where exactly 
the computer was and who was using it. He therefore made a request to 
Shaw under section 7(3)(c.1) of the Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act,47 requesting the subscriber information  
 
                                                                                                                                  
43 Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 44. 
44 Id., at para. 45. 
45 Id., at paras. 46-49. 
46 Spencer, supra, note 7, at paras. 7-12. 
47 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 
[hereinafter “PIPEDA”]. 
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associated with the IP address. No warrant was obtained. Shaw complied 
with the request and provided their customer’s name, address and 
telephone number. 
The question on appeal was whether section 8 demands that a 
warrant be sought and obtained to access Internet subscriber information. 
The Crown argued that section 8 protects informational privacy only 
where the user has a reasonable expectation of privacy. In Morelli and 
Cole, the data searched involved information going to the accused’s core 
biographical information. In Spencer, however, the information sought — 
the name, address and telephone number matching a publicly available IP 
address — did “not touch on the core of Mr. Spencer’s biographical 
information”.48 There is no privacy in a name and address. 
The Supreme Court disagreed. What was being sought was not 
simply generic biographical information; “it was the identity of an 
Internet subscriber which corresponded to particular Internet usage”.49 
Knowing both the IP address, and associated user activity, combined with 
identifying information, would tell you a great deal about that 
individual’s biographic core. Accordingly, the accused did have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the identifying information.50  
The logic of the Court’s reasoning is compelling when we 
understand privacy as anonymity. Privacy is often associated with the 
right to control personal information about oneself. But to think of 
privacy only as the “right to control information” obscures the equally 
important right to anonymity.51  
Anonymity permits individuals to act in the public sphere but to 
preserve freedom from identification and surveillance.52 An analogy with 
the physical world is helpful. We enjoy a degree of anonymity as we go 
about our daily lives. We may go to the office, the gym, the bar, the 
shopping mall, the medical clinic, the place of worship, or maybe even 
the swingers’ club. These are all (to varying degrees) public places where 
we are no doubt seen by others. But we might feel more inhibited going 
                                                                                                                                  
48 Spencer, supra, note 7, at para. 25. 
49 Id., at para. 32. 
50 Id., at para. 45. 
51 See id., at paras. 38-51; A.F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 
1967) 7; Duarte, supra, note 12, at 46; R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417,  
at 429 (S.C.C.); Andrea Slane & Lisa M. Austin, “What’s in a Name? Privacy and Citizenship in the 
Voluntary Disclosure of Subscriber Information in Online Child Exploitation Investigations” (2011) 
57 Crim. L.Q. 486 [hereinafter “Slane & Austin”]. 
52 Spencer, supra, note 7, at para. 43 (citing Slane & Austin, id., at 31-32). 
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to these places if there were a life-size nametag hanging over our heads 
everywhere we went. That inhibition might in turn stymie the creativity 
and spontaneity that are necessary for individuals to thrive in a free and 
democratic society.53 “The mere fact that someone leaves the privacy of 
their home and enters a public space does not mean that the person 
abandons all of his or her privacy rights, despite the fact that as a 
practical matter, such a person may not be able to control who observes 
him or her in public.”54 
The Court cited R. v. Wise, a physical world case involving privacy 
as anonymity. The Court in Wise held that the ongoing monitoring of a 
vehicle’s whereabouts on public highways using a tracking device 
amounted to a violation of the suspect’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.55 It could have been argued that the suspect was driving his car 
in public areas for all the world to see, and therefore, did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, but even the Crown conceded in Wise 
that ongoing beeper monitoring violates the suspect’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.56 
Browsing the Internet is the digital world equivalent of driving 
around town. We drive from website to website — to shop, to visit our 
virtual worlds, to do our banking and to satisfy our quirky curiosities — 
in full view of each website we visit and our Internet service provider. 
Through the use of “cookies” and other devices, Internet search engines 
like Google and social networking sites like Facebook gather information 
about our likes, interests and shopping habits. Only “by guarding the link 
between the information and the identity of the person to whom it 
relates” can the user be assured that Internet activity remains private.57  
                                                                                                                                  
53 White, supra, note 12, at 787-89, as quoted in Duarte, supra, note 12, at 54; see also  
R. v. Ward, [2012] O.J. No. 4587, 2012 ONCA 660, at para. 48 (Ont. C.A.). 
54 Spencer, supra, note 7, at para. 44. 
55 R. v. Wise, [1992] S.C.J. No. 16, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, at 538 (S.C.C.). 
56 Id. It should be noted that Wise was decided at a time when the police were limited to 
fixing (now seemingly ancient “beepers” onto cars — technology that is now obsolete owing to GPS 
tracking devices). In United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), the United States Supreme Court 
reached a similar result as in Wise in the context of modern GPS tracking devices, and in Torrey 
Dale Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368 at 1370 (2015), it clarified that its holding in Jones 
applies equally to tracking people as it does to vehicles. 
57 Spencer, supra, note 7, at para. 46. 
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(e) R. v. Fearon (2014) 
The Court’s first five digital-search-and-seizure decisions arguably 
expanded the ambit of our section 8 privacy rights and imposed new 
requirements on police seeking to search our digital devices. Fearon took 
an (unexpected) opposite turn. In a narrow 4-3 decision, the Supreme 
Court in Fearon held that law enforcement has the power — albeit a 
limited one — to conduct a warrantless search of a cell phone under the 
common law search-incident-to-arrest power.  
Fearon was arrested following an armed robbery of a jewellery 
merchant at a Toronto flea market. Upon arrest, a pat-down search 
revealed Fearon’s cell phone, which police accessed both at that moment 
and again later at the station. Scrolling through Fearon’s photographs, the 
police found an incriminating draft text message referring to jewellery 
and opening with the words, “We did it…”. They also found a 
photograph of a handgun. Police subsequently recovered the handgun 
during a search of the getaway vehicle. The trial judge found that the 
handgun used in the robbery was the same as the one in the photograph 
and found in the getaway vehicle.58  
At trial and on appeal, Fearon argued that both searches violated his 
section 8 Charter rights and sought to have the inculpatory text message 
and photograph excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter. In response, 
the Crown argued that the searches were mere applications of the 
common law police power to search a suspect incident to arrest, and 
therefore reasonable under section 8 of the Charter. 
A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable.59 But the common 
law in Canada has long recognized the search-incident-to-arrest power as a 
narrow exception to the presumptive rule.60 For more than two decades, the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception has remained a limited exception 
because it has been tightly tied to its purposes. First, the arrest itself must 
be lawful. Second, the search must aim at a valid search-incident-to-arrest 
purpose, such as (1) police safety; (2) safeguarding evidence; or (3) 
discovering evidence.61 
                                                                                                                                  
58 Fearon, supra, note 1, at paras. 5-9. 
59 R. v. Nolet, [2010] S.C.J. No. 24, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 851, at para. 21 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Nolet”]; Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 161 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Hunter”]. 
60 See Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] S.C.J. No. 10, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158, at 181-82 (S.C.C.); 
R. v. Caslake, [1998] S.C.J. No. 3, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51, at para. 17 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Caslake”]. 
61 Caslake, id., at para. 25. 
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The question in Fearon was whether the warrantless search of a 
suspect’s cell phone falls within this exception. Justice Cromwell, 
writing for the majority, held that it should. He noted that cell phones, 
like computers, are quantitatively and qualitatively different from 
physical world storage devices — both because of their immense storage 
capacity and the intimate, personal nature of the information stored on 
them — but held that to exclude them from the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception would upset the balance between privacy interests and law 
enforcement’s needs. Justice Cromwell held that the appropriate balance 
can be struck by permitting but circumscribing the search of cell phones 
incident to arrest. This would be accomplished by ensuring that the 
search is truly incidental to the arrest in that it promotes at least one of 
the valid law enforcement purposes — i.e., protecting the police, the 
accused or the public; preserving evidence; or discovering evidence, 
“including locating additional suspects, in situations in which the 
investigation will be stymied or significantly hampered absent the ability 
to promptly search the cell phone incident to arrest”.62  
To help ensure that searches incident to arrest of cell phones remained 
tightly moored to these legitimate purposes, after-the-fact review is 
especially important. Accordingly, Cromwell J. wrote, officers must make 
“detailed notes” of what they have examined on the cell phone.63 A careful 
record is essential to ensuring meaningful after-the-fact review.64 
2. Digital Privacy: A Step Forward or Just a Sidestep? 
(a) The Problem with Fearon 
Until Fearon, it appeared that the Supreme Court was marching 
along a teleological path to greater privacy protections in the Digital Age. 
Fearon arguably undermines that inference. Whereas the Morelli/ 
Cole/TELUS/Vu/Spencer line of cases focused on bringing section 8 
Charter rights into the Digital Age, Fearon appears to try to squeeze a 
Digital Age problem back into an Analog World box.  
                                                                                                                                  
62 Fearon, supra, note 1, at para. 83. 
63 Id., at paras. 82-83. 
64 Id., at para. 82. 
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The search-incident-to-arrest rules were devised at a time when 
people carried only their wallet, keys and maybe a pack of cigarettes65 on 
their person. In 1998, when Caslake — the Supreme Court’s leading 
search-incident-to-arrest case — was decided, it would have seemed  
far-fetched to imagine people carrying around miniature computer-
phones containing copies of all of their private correspondence, their 
scheduling calendars, as well as their Internet browsing history and 
information stored on any number of mobile phone “apps”. As the 
unanimous United States Supreme Court observed in its decision on 
warrantless cell phone searches in Riley v. California, “[a] decade ago 
police officers searching an arrestee might have occasionally stumbled 
across a highly personal item such as a diary … Today, by contrast, it is 
no exaggeration to say that many of the more than 90% of American 
adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of 
nearly every aspect of their lives — from the mundane to the intimate.”66 
A search of a cell phone can reveal as much about its user as a search 
of that person’s laptop or desktop computer — and then some. Canadians 
increasingly engage in private text-based communications using their cell 
phones. More than any other computing device, cell phones contain 
massive amounts of private communications. In 2008, 44 per cent of 
Canadians said that text messaging was the most common activity they 
performed on their cell phone aside from voice calls; 11 per cent said  
e-mailing; and 6 per cent said instant messaging.67 Since 2008, 
Canadians’ use of text messaging has more than quadrupled. In 2012, the 
total text messages sent in Canada numbered 96.5 billion.68 As 
MacKenzie J. observed in R. v. Giles, “the explosion of e-mail and other 
text-based modes of instantaneous communication has meant that much 
of our communication that was once exclusively verbal is now by 
electronic text”.69 Nearly all of these communications can be retrieved 
                                                                                                                                  
65 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
66 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), at 2490 (U.S. Sup. Ct.) [hereinafter “Riley”]. 
67 2008 Wireless Attitudes Study Conducted on behalf of the Canadian Wireless 
Telecommunications Association, at 13, September 12, 2008, available online: <http://www.cwta.ca/ 
CWTASite/english/pdf/DecimaStudy_2008.pdf>. 
68 Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association, “Mobile Originated Text Messages in 
Canada Yearly (2002-2012)”, online: <http://www.cwta.ca/blog/2013/05/06/canadians-sent-96-5-billion-
text-messages-in-2012/>. 
69 R. v. Giles, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2918, 2007 BCSC 1147, at para. 43 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter 
“Giles”]; R. v. Belcourt, [2012] B.C.J. No. 2636, 296 C.C.C. (3d) 163, at para. 9 (B.C.S.C.). 
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from a cell phone — including those that the user has deleted.70 Thus, the 
police often search cell phones for the primary purpose of retrieving 
private communications.71 That type of search — the acquisition of 
private communications — has traditionally garnered a higher (not 
lower) degree of protection in the form of protections under Part VI of 
the Criminal Code.  
In addition, cell phones — unlike our larger computing devices — 
are invariably on our person at any given time. As the United States 
Supreme Court noted in Riley, cell phones “are now such a pervasive and 
insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might 
conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy”.72 Cell 
phones also keep invisible records of every cellular tower and every 
WiFi network the user has ever logged into.73 Given that most of us carry 
our cell phones everywhere, these records give law enforcement access 
to what is essentially a retroactive tracking device, with which they can 
retrace all of the user’s movements, beginning from when the user first 
purchased the phone.74 Thus, the vast repository of highly personal data  
 
                                                                                                                                  
70 Extraction Report in In the Matter of the Search of an Apple I-Phone model A1332 
with IC#________, online: <https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/iphone-forensics-report_redacted.pdf> 
[hereinafter “Extraction Report”]; American Civil Liberties Union, “New Document Sheds Light on 
Government’s Ability to Search iPhones”, February 26, 2013, online: <https://www.aclu.org/ 
blog/technology-and-liberty-criminal-law-reform-immigrants-rights/new-document-sheds-light>. 
See also R. v. Vye, [2014] B.C.J. No. 98, 301 C.R.R. (2d) 180, at para. 5 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter 
“Vye”]; Giles, supra, note 69, at paras. 18-19; Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 43. The cell phone 
in Giles could store 10,000 messages, and the storage capacity of cell phones has grown by more 
than 4,000 times since Giles. See Apple – iPhone 6 – Technical Specifications, online: 
<https://www.apple.com/ca/iphone-6/specs/>. 
71 In Vye, supra, note, 70, at para. 5, the police retrieved 633 text messages from the 
accused’s phone over a six-month period, including deleted messages; in R. v. Hiscoe, [2013] N.S.J. 
No. 188, 328 N.S.R. (2d) 381, at paras. 5-8 (N.S.C.A.), the police reviewed a number of text 
messages in the accused’s cell phone at the arrest scene before downloading the contents of the 
entire phone to a DVD; in R. v. Liew, [2012] O.J. No. 1365, 2012 ONSC 1826, at para. 26  
(Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Liew”], the police conducted a “fairly extensive search” of the text 
messages in the accused’s cell phone at the police detachment; and in Giles, supra, note, 69, at para. 13, 
the police retrieved 164 e-mail messages from the co-accused’s cell phone. 
72 Riley, supra, note 66, at 2484. 
73 Extraction Report, supra, note 70. 
74 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, No. 12-12928 (slip opinion), at *76 (11 Cir. May 5, 
2015), per Martin J., dissenting. In Davis, the government obtained 67 days of cell site location 
data disclosing the suspect’s location every time he made or received a call. During that 67 -day 
period, the suspect received 5,803 phone calls, so the prosecution had 11,606 data points about 
his location. 
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that the Court was concerned about protecting in Morelli and Vu is 
arguably even more at risk in the Fearon search-incident-to-arrest 
context than in the home computer context.  
The majority’s ruling in Fearon also creates another curious tension 
with Vu. If the police find your cell phone or computer in your home 
pursuant to a valid warrant, they cannot search your device (unless the 
warrant specifically allows it),75 but if they arrest you without a warrant 
with those same devices, they have the right to search them.76 
That distinction might have made more sense in a pre-Digital Age. In 
earlier times, no search of a place was more invasive than the search of 
one’s home.77 This is no longer true. As the United States Supreme Court 
wrote in Riley:  
In 1926, Learned Hand observed … that it is “a totally different thing 
to search a man’s pockets and use against him what they contain, from 
ransacking his house for everything which may incriminate him.” If his 
pockets contain a cell phone, however, that is no longer true. Indeed, a 
cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more 
than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains 
in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it 
also contains a broad array of private information never found in a 
home in any form — unless the phone is.78 
Given the privacy interests at stake in Fearon, one would think that 
the law enforcement interests must be particularly strong to justify the 
warrantless search. Curiously, however, they appear more attenuated than 
even the ordinary search-incident-to-arrest context.  
The Fearon majority identified three legitimate purposes of the 
search incident to arrest of cell phones: (1) police and public safety; (2) 
safeguarding the evidence; or (3) discovering evidence. It is difficult to 
see how any of these goals would be undermined by a warrant 
requirement.  
                                                                                                                                  
75 Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at paras. 46-49. 
76 Fearon, supra, note 1, at paras. 82-83. 
77 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 at 390 (1914) (discussing the “a man’s house is his 
castle” doctrine); see also R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, at para. 22 
(S.C.C.) (individuals are entitled to a high expectation of privacy in the home because it is “the place 
where our most intimate and private activities are most likely to take place”). 
78 Riley, supra, note 66, at 2490-91 (citing United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F. 2d 202, 203 
(2d Cir.)). 
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It is uncontroversial that the police have the lawful authority to seize 
the phone, provided that they have a reasonable basis to believe that the 
phone may contain evidence of the alleged offence.79 So there is no real 
concern that the phone will be used as a physical weapon. If the concern, 
on the other hand, is the risk that the suspect has summoned his 
confederates via text or voice communication to come to his aid and 
ambush the police, then, as Karakatsanis J. noted in dissent, the “exigent 
circumstances” exception can ably deal with this Hollywood scenario 
(provided that the police have reasonable grounds to believe that the 
suspect has summoned his accomplices to his aid).80 Indeed, the exigent 
circumstances exception is a well-established common-law exception 
to the warrant requirement, which permits police to search or seize 
property where there is a “risk of imminent loss or destruction of the 
evidence or contraband” and “where there is a concern for public or 
police safety”.81 Parliament codified the exigent circumstances exception 
under section 487.11 of the Criminal Code, providing that police may 
exercise powers of search and seizure “without a warrant if the 
conditions for obtaining a warrant exist but by reason of exigent 
circumstances it would be impracticable to obtain a warrant”.82 
The other goals identified by the Fearon majority as justifying a 
limited warrantless search — the preservation of evidence and discovery 
of evidence — are both valid goals, but it is difficult to see how these 
goals would be frustrated if the police were to seize the cell phone at the 
scene but wait to search it until they had obtained a warrant.83 As the 
dissenting judges observed, “[t]he text messages and photographs 
                                                                                                                                  
79 For distinction between the right to seize and right to search, see Cole, supra, note 4, at 
para. 65 (“The police may well have been authorized to take physical control of the laptop and CD 
temporarily, and for the limited purpose of safeguarding potential evidence of a crime until a search 
warrant could be obtained.”); see also R. v. Butters, [2014] O.J. No. 2159, 309 C.R.R. (2d) 299, at 
para. 36 (Ont. C.J.) (“If the police can ameliorate the risks of further criminality … by taking 
physical control over a computer tower without putting the material privacy interest at risk by 
delaying inspection until a warrant is obtained, the law should and in my view does accommodate 
it.”); R. v. Seguin, [2015] O.J. No. 1424, 2015 ONSC 1908, at para. 35 (Ont. S.C.J.) (noting that 
“[t]here is a distinction to be drawn between seizing a computer for the purpose of searching it and 
actually searching it”). 
80 Fearon, supra, note 1, at paras. 139-140, per Karakatsanis J., dissenting; see also Riley, 
supra, note 66, at 2484-85. 
81 R. v. Kelsy, [2011] O.J. No. 4159, 283 O.A.C. 201, at para. 24 (Ont. C.A.). 
82 Criminal Code, supra, note 11, s. 487.11. 
83 Liew, supra, note 71, at para. 124 (“The seizure of the phone goes a long way towards 
achieving the objective of ensuring that evidence against the accused is secured.”) 
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discovered in this case … generally would not disappear if police wait to 
acquire a warrant.”84  
The Crown raised the concern that if the phone were not searched 
immediately, then the suspect’s confederates could remotely delete the 
data on that device. Even assuming a highly sophisticated group of 
criminals, this problem is not without a relatively easy solution. The 
police could simply remove the cell phone’s battery thus disconnecting it 
from any remote or cellular networks, or they could place the phone in a 
“Faraday bag”, an inexpensive aluminum bag that blocks wireless 
communications.85 Given the incredibly high privacy interests at stake in 
a cell phone (potentially millions of e-mails, texts and personal 
photographs) and the attenuated law enforcement interest (nothing they 
can get at the scene cannot be retrieved after a warrant is obtained) the 
balance struck in Fearon appears off-kilter. 
(b) Morelli/Vu: The Unfinished Business of Setting Limits on Searches of 
Digital Devices 
While the Morelli/Vu line of cases appears to offer more to individual 
privacy than Fearon, its impact is potentially modest. The lesson for law 
enforcement from Morelli, Cole, TELUS, Vu and Spencer is clear: If you 
want to search someone’s computer or other digital device, get a warrant 
and get the proper warrant. But if this is the only lesson, then these cases 
will have been a Pyrrhic victory for digital privacy.  
Vu demands that the warrant specifically authorize the search of 
digital devices. Obtaining such a warrant, however, is not a tough task 
for law enforcement. Going forward, the police must establish in the 
Information to Obtain that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
any computers they discover will contain the evidence for which they are 
looking.86 This is not a high hurdle. Most people alive today own 
multiple computer devices and use them constantly. Given the 
ubiquitousness of computer use, there is a good chance that, if a crime 
has been committed, there will be some evidence on a computer. Unless 
we develop additional rules constraining the manner of a computer 
search, there is a danger that Vu will simply become a lesson to police to  
 
                                                                                                                                  
84 Fearon, supra, note 1, at para. 146, per Karakatsanis J. dissenting. 
85 Id., at para. 144. 
86 Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 48. 
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include computer-related terms in their ITO boilerplate. The question 
thus becomes: Once the police have grounds to obtain a computer 
warrant, what sensible limitations should be applied to limit the manner 
of search?  
This question has traditionally been a key concern of section 8. Our 
section 8 rights are protected primarily by two rules. First, police must 
obtain judicial authorization (usually a search warrant) for the search 
before they conduct it.87 The warrant requirement ensures that before a 
search is conducted, an impartial judicial officer (i.e., the issuing justice) 
turns her mind to the state’s interest in conducting the search and the 
individual’s privacy interest in being left alone. Second, even where a 
warrant has been issued, the search must be conducted in a reasonable 
manner.88 This second prophylactic rule ensures that the search is no 
more intrusive than is reasonably necessary to achieve law enforcement’s 
objectives.  
The Morelli/Vu line of cases deal with section 8’s prior authorization 
requirement. They do not speak directly to section 8’s reasonable 
manner requirement. And it is the reasonable manner requirement that is 
especially vexing when it comes to computers and digital information.89  
This problem flows from a computer’s unique features. First, the 
search and seizure process is inverted when it comes to digital devices. 
In the physical world, one is entitled to a high reasonable expectation of 
privacy in one’s home, for example. As such, the search of one’s home is 
seen as particularly invasive.90 Search warrants grant police permission 
to search a dwelling usually for only limited periods of time (often only 
one day). Items are then seized. The search-and-seizure process with 
respect to computers is inverted. After seizing the computer during the 
initial search, the police may take months (or even years) to conduct a 
full forensic search of the device. This inversion means that the time 
limits which would apply in the classic search-and-then-seizure sequence 
are meaningless. Related to the inversion of the search/seizure process is 
                                                                                                                                  
87 Hunter v. Southam Inc., supra, note 59, at 160. 
88 R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at 278 (S.C.C.). 
89 See Gerald Chan, “Life after Vu: Manner of Computer Searches and Search Protocols” in 
J. Cameron, B.L. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds., Constitutional Cases 2013 (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 433 
(for extended commentary on manner-of-search issues) [hereinafter “Chan”]. 
90 R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, at para. 22 (S.C.C.) (individuals 
are entitled to a high expectation of privacy in the home because it is “the place where our most 
intimate and private activities are most likely to take place”). 
460 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
the problem of overseizure. Because the computer is seized first and 
searched later, the police are necessarily seizing the haystack to search 
for the needle. 
If we are to take seriously Morelli’s holding that there are few 
searches more intrusive than the computer search, then these lengthy 
computer searches are the privacy equivalent of having one’s home open 
to the police for months on end — for them to come and go as they 
please as new case leads develop — without any need to go back before 
a judicial officer to get a new warrant.  
Second, as noted above, a computer is rarely a stand-alone, self-
contained entity. Thus, even where there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that a computer contains documents evidencing crime, there is a 
strong likelihood that this evidence is intermingled with private 
information on other computers that the government has no reasonable 
grounds to search or seize.91  
The problem of intermingling is particularly acute in the digital 
world. In the physical world, the physical location specified in the 
warrant necessarily narrows the ambit of the search. If the warrant gives 
the police the authority to search “1000 Elm Street”, then there is little 
danger that the police, acting in good faith, will stray into the neighbours’ 
houses.  
Not so with computers. The digital world is different, particularly in 
settings where data is shared between multiple users or where data is 
stored on common hardware because the boundaries between one 
computer and the next are amorphous. For example, the police may have 
reasonable grounds to believe that a suspect has accessed child 
pornography from the computer in his living room. But what if that 
computer is a shared computer, used by the suspect’s spouse and two 
adolescent children? Each of these individuals has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in data stored on the computer. The police have no 
business seizing or searching data belonging to those third parties, but 
their data is intermingled with data for which they do have grounds to 
seize. Let us further assume that the spouse is a physician who 
sometimes uses the home computer to correspond with patients. Each of 
those patients also has a privacy interest in that correspondence stored on 
                                                                                                                                  
91 See, e.g., Cole, supra, note 4, at para. 88 (illegal photographs intermingled with 
photographs of the accused’s wife); In the Matter of the Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 
2d 953, at 958 (N.D. Ill. 2004) [hereinafter “3817”]; United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, at 1132 
(10th Cir. 2009). 
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the computer, raising the specter of potentially limitless innocent  
third party privacy interests commingled with the data that the police 
have grounds to seize.92 
The challenges may be even more complex in the workplace. The 
typical workplace computer does not exist in a silo. In many companies 
and institutions, multiple computers are connected to each other across 
cities, countries and continents via company network servers. It is not 
unusual for thousands of users to store their work product on a common 
or shared server. Each one of those users potentially has privacy interests 
in data stored on that network. And if the information stored on the 
computer includes private (or privileged) client information, then each 
one of those clients may have an expectation of privacy in data stored on 
the company network.  
The problem of intermingling will only be exacerbated as users 
continue to shift data storage from devices to the “cloud”. Cloud 
computing refers to the capacity of Internet-connected devices to display 
and edit data stored on remote servers.93 Often users may not even know 
whether particular information is stored on the device or in the cloud. 
But where data is stored in the cloud, it will be intermingled with the 
data of potentially millions of other users — all of whom have unique 
privacy interests. 
Further, doctrines that limit the invasiveness of physical searches do 
not map easily — or at all — onto computer searches. The ambit of a 
physical-world search warrant is limited by the realities of the physical 
world, which prevent the typical search from becoming limitless, dragnet 
searches. In United States Fourth Amendment parlance, this is sometimes 
known as the “elephant-in-a-matchbox” doctrine (i.e., if the warrant 
authorizes police to search only for an elephant, then they have no 
business looking in a matchbox).94 Likewise, the plain-view doctrine, 
which authorizes the seizure of unanticipated evidence inadvertently 
discovered where the officer is lawfully in the premises,95 is  
 
                                                                                                                                  
92 See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing Inc., 621 F3d 1162 at 1176-77 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (en banc), modifying 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) [hereinafter “Comprehensive 
Drug Testing Inc.”]. 
93 Riley, supra, note 66, at 2491.  
94 See Vu (B.C.C.A.), supra, note 22, at para. 47; see also Jackson v. Florida, 18 So. 3d 
1016, at 1028, 1029 (Fla. Sup. Ct., 2009), cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 1144 (2010). 
95 R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631, at para. 37 (S.C.C.). 
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circumscribed in the physical world. To qualify for plain view treatment, 
the items seized must be found within the area being searched and they 
must be conspicuous.96  
These concepts do not translate into the digital world. What is in 
plain view on the computer or cell phone? This question has been the 
subject of much academic discussion, but yields no easy answer.97 In the 
digital world, the plain view exception has the potential to swallow up a 
virtually limitless space. As long as the investigator is making a good 
faith effort to search only for evidence specified in the warrant, then 
anything discovered on the computer is potentially captured under the 
plain view doctrine. Law enforcement will also argue vigorously that 
once given permission to access a computer, they must be able to search 
every file and folder — at least in cursory fashion — because the suspect 
may be adept at hiding or concealing files in difficult-to-find places. This 
gives breadth to the plain view exception that is unfathomable in the 
physical world context.  
3. The Way Forward: Rigorous Manner-of-Search Review 
In light of these challenges, manner-of-search review is the next 
frontier in digital-search-and-seizure litigation. Vu and Fearon each raise 
distinct challenges to privacy, but the solution to both is to insist on 
rigorous manner-of-search review.  
In the search warrant context, judges and justices of the peace should 
insist that police seeking a computer search warrant propose “search 
protocols” as a means to restrict the invasiveness of a computer search. 
These protocols will help constrain and limit the invasiveness of a 
computer search, and will foster meaningful after-the-fact review.  
In the search-incident-to-arrest context in Fearon, there is no 
opportunity to impose judicially-sanctioned, ex ante search restrictions 
because the Fearon exception is, by definition, warrantless. This makes 
after-the-fact review especially important (which the majority 
acknowledged in Fearon).98 Rigorous after-the-fact review is essential 
to ensure that cell phone searches incident to arrest do not become 
                                                                                                                                  
96 Id. 
97 See Ray Ming Chang, “Why the Plain View Doctrine Should Not Apply to Digital 
Evidence” (2007) 12 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Adv. 31, at 33; Lisa Jorgenson, “In Plain View:  
R v Jones and the Challenge of Protecting Privacy Rights in an Era of Computer Search” (2013) 46 
U.B.C. L. Rev. 791, at 798-18. 
98 Fearon, supra, note 1, at paras. 82-83. 
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fishing expeditions. And to enable that rigorous review, police will 
need to make complete and accurate records of their cell phone search, 
which will require that they video-record or otherwise digitally log 
their searches.  
(a) Ex Ante Rules and Search Protocols (Where a Warrant Is 
Required)99 
“Search protocols” refer to ex ante rules, proposed by the police and 
approved by the issuing justice, that specify how the police will conduct 
a computer search. The point of a search protocol is to ensure that the 
search is “conducted in a reasonable manner”, as section 8 of the Charter 
requires.  
Search protocols can involve myriad possibilities. They can define, 
and thereby constrain, the search for specified keywords, file types and 
date ranges; they can limit the search to text files or graphics files; and 
they can focus on certain software programs.100 They can also prescribe 
the use of more sophisticated search tools based on constantly evolving 
forensic technologies that allow law enforcement to conduct computer 
searches without opening files by searching based on “file headers”101 or 
“hash values”.102 Some of those programs, such as Guidance Software’s 
                                                                                                                                  
99 I have written about the importance of search protocols in an earlier article. See Nader 
Hasan, “R. v. Vu: The Right to Digital Privacy and the Need for Search Protocols” (2014) 35:1 For 
the Defence 6 [hereinafter “Hasan”]. See also Chan, supra, note 89. 
100 3817, supra, note 91, at 959. 
101 A “file header” is an internal computer file identifier that tells the computer about the file. 
Even if someone tries to disguise an image file by giving it a name and extension that makes it look 
like a word processing document, the computer and forensic software will not be fooled because the 
file header will reveal the true nature of the file. See Christina M. Schuck, “A Search for the 
Caselaw to Support the Computer Search Guidance in United States v. Comprehensive Drug 
Testing” (2012) 16 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 741, at 750 [hereinafter “Schuck”]. 
102 A “hash value” for a file is an identifier that characterizes a data set. The relationship 
between a hash value and its data set compares roughly to the relationship between an organism and 
its DNA sequence or fingerprint. See R. v. Braudy, [2009] O.J. No. 347, at para. 21 (Ont. S.C.J.) 
[hereinafter “Braudy”], per Stinson J. (explaining that the hash value “is an unique number [of a 
digital file] that could only be the product of applying the same formula to an identical file: it is a  
so-called ‘digital finger print’”); see also Lily Robinton, “Courting Chaos: Conflicting Guidance from 
Courts Highlights the Need for Clearer Rules to Govern the Search and Seizure of Digital Evidence” 
(2010) 12 Yale J. L. & Tech 311, at 326-27 [hereinafter “Robinton”]; Kerr, supra, note 33, at 544-46. 
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“EnCase Forensic Toolkit”, are already used by law enforcement 
throughout Canada and other jurisdictions.103  
Vu should not be read as closing the door on search protocols. In Vu, 
the Court declined to mandate search protocols as a matter of 
constitutional imperative, but made it clear that it was not “foreclos[ing] 
the possibility that our developing understanding of computer searches 
and changes in technology may make it appropriate to impose search 
protocols in a broader range of cases in the future”.104 The Court noted 
that as the case law develops, “after-the-fact review may lead courts to 
set out specific rules according to which searches must be conducted”, 
which can then be imported into search protocols.105 In particular, the 
Court wrote that issuing justices may find it “necessary and practical” to 
impose search protocols in cases involving “confidential intellectual 
property or potentially privileged information”.106 In those cases, protocols 
could be imposed when police first request authorization to search the 
computer. Alternatively, issuing justices may prefer a “two-stage approach” 
where they would first issue a warrant authorizing the seizure of the 
computer and then have police return for an additional authorization to 
search the seized device, which would include a protocol that would limit 
the scope of the search.107  
(i) Search Protocols Help Address the Unique Problems Posed by 
Computers’ Unique Features 
As discussed above, the unique features of computers — the highly 
personal nature of computer data, the vastness of their storage capacity 
and their interconnectedness — make properly limited computer searches 
more challenging. Only carefully tailored search protocols can address 
the unique manner-of-search issues posed by computers and digital 
technologies.  
Where police are going into a situation where there is likely to be 
intermingling of data — i.e., if the computer is found in a multi-person 
dwelling unit or is the server of a large company — the police should be  
 
                                                                                                                                  
103 See Palumbo, supra, note 33, at 1001; see also Little, supra, note 41, at para. 27, per 
Fuerst J. (describing officer’s testimony regarding EnCase forensic software). 
104 Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 62. 
105 Id., at para. 55. 
106 Id., at para. 62. 
107 Id. 
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able to articulate in the ITO what innocent third party privacy interests 
exist, and what measures they will take to minimize the intrusion. The 
issuing justice should, in turn, scrutinize those measures and issue a 
warrant that adequately protects those third-party interests as well as the 
suspect’s residual privacy interests. Police should bear the onus of 
proving what search protocols will permit them to strike the appropriate 
balance between privacy and the needs of law enforcement because they 
“have available to them the necessary software, technology and expertise 
to enable them to tailor their searches in a fashion that will generate the 
information they seek, if it exists, while at the same time minimizing the 
intrusion on the computer user’s privacy rights in other information 
stored on the computer”.108 
While search protocols entail infinite possibilities and will be highly 
case-specific, they may include:109  
 Where the search involves a shared network or shared hard-drive, the 
protocols should specify that the police may not search any part of 
hard-drive or server that the suspect did not access.  
 If the search involves a shared network or shared hard-drive, the 
protocols should specify that the police should not examine files 
created prior to when the suspect first gained access to those shared 
devices.  
 Date-range and keyword search restrictions will be appropriate in 
many cases.110 
 Where applicable, the protocols should specify that police must work 
with third parties to ensure that safeguards are put in place to protect 
privileged, private and commercially sensitive information.111  
                                                                                                                                  
108 R. v. Jones, [2011] O.J. No. 4388, 107 O.R. (3d) 241, at para. 50 (Ont. C.A.). 
109 Hasan, supra, note 99, at 8. 
110 See R. v. Cross, [2007] O.J. No. 5384, at paras. 21-27 (Ont. S.C.J.) (search warrant 
contained a protocol that the police shall “limit search to information concerning e-mail of August 6, 
2005…”). 
111 See Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 61, 
[2002] 3 S.C.R. 209, at para. 49 (S.C.C.) (“In the interim, I will articulate the general principles that 
govern the legality of searches of law offices as a matter of common law until Parliament, if it sees 
fit, re-enacts legislation on the issue.”); supra, note 92, at 1175-77 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), 
modifying 579 F.3d 989, at 1166-76 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
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 In certain investigations, specific file types ought to be excluded 
from the search because of the unlikelihood that incriminatory 
information will be found in such files. For example, investment 
advisers engaged in inside trading are unlikely to snap “selfies” of 
their unlawful trades, so there is a strong case for excluding image 
and video files from the search in such a case. 
 Police currently have access to certain forensic software programs 
that have the potential to limit the invasiveness of the computer 
search.112 As noted above, forensic software currently available to 
police allows analysts to conduct searches based on “file headers” or 
“hash values”. The police can then, for example, compare hash 
values found in the computer files against databases of hash values 
known to be child pornography.113 In many cases, it will be 
reasonable to insist that the police perform hash-value or file-header 
search before embarking on a more intrusive file-by-file review of 
the entire computer. 
 Where police intend to use particular forensic programs to search the 
computer, those programs should be listed in the search protocols. 
 The protocols should specify an end date of the search. If the police 
want to extend the search beyond the end date, then they ought to go 
back before the issuing justice and persuade her why they need 
ongoing access to someone’s computer. 
(ii) Search Protocols Foster Reviewability 
Section 8 is concerned with preventing unreasonable searches from 
occurring — not merely with punishing unreasonable searches after the 
fact.114 An advantage of search protocols is that there will be fewer 
unreasonable searches because the police will know the rules of the game 
before they conduct the search.  
And when the defence does challenge the reasonableness of the 
search, the search protocols will provide judges with an objective  
 
                                                                                                                                  
112 See Palumbo, supra, note 33, at 1001; see also Little, supra, note 41, at para. 27, per 
Fuerst J. (describing officer’s testimony regarding EnCase forensic software). 
113 Braudy, supra, note 102, at paras. 21-23. 
114 Vu (S.C.C.), supra, note 1, at para. 51. 
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baseline against which to assess the reasonableness of the police search. 
If the police failed to adhere to the search protocols, then the search is 
prima facie unreasonable. If the police did adhere to the search protocols, 
then defence counsel would have to show why these protocols were 
unreasonable.  
Without that objective baseline, the section 8 voir dire will become a 
battle of experts conducted in a vacuum. The police will explain why 
they could not have conducted the computer search any other way. The 
defence computer expert will testify that there were many ways as to 
how the search could have been conducted in a less intrusive way. Search 
protocols would give judges an objective baseline against which to assess 
these arguments.  
(iii) Search Protocols Will Ensure the Integrity of Evidence 
Search protocols can also help law enforcement ensure the integrity 
of evidence by requiring that computer searches to be done in controlled 
laboratory settings by technically trained officers. Computers are 
sophisticated devices. Improper handling — or even manual computer 
searches done outside of the laboratory setting — can damage or destroy 
evidence.115 Simply opening a file or turning on a computer can 
overwrite data, and may alter the “meta-data”, which show when the 
suspect created or last accessed a file.116  
The manual search of a computer is the equivalent of walking into a 
murder scene with muddy boots and removing bare-handed a knife from 
the victim and dropping it in one’s coat pocket. Search protocols can help 
law enforcement address these risks. In both Vu and in Fearon, for 
example, the officers performed a manual search on the suspect’s digital 
devices.117 If the time that the device was accessed had been at issue in 
those cases, the officer likely would have compromised that evidence 
simply by accessing the device.  
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(b) Ex Post Review and the Importance of Record-Keeping  
(Warrantless Context) 
The Charter’s default position is that the State needs a warrant to 
search a place or thing,118 including — or rather, especially — digital 
devices. The carve-out in Fearon is exceptional. But to ensure that the 
Fearon exception does not swallow the general rule, courts must insist 
on rigorous ex post manner-of-search review of searches and seizures of 
digital devices.  
The majority in Fearon was alive to this concern, noting that 
“[a]fter-the-fact judicial review is especially important where, as in the 
case of searches incident to arrest, there is no prior authorization.”119 
Going forward, the courts will have to devise ways to ensure meaningful 
after-the-fact review of warrantless cell phone searches. This challenge is 
unique from the warranted context, where the manner of search can be 
constrained ex ante by search protocols attached to the warrant. 
Meaningful after-the-fact reasonableness review involves 
scrutinizing the police conduct to determine whether the police search 
was more far-reaching than necessary, with regard to the objectives of 
the search; the nature of the offence for which the police have reasonable 
grounds to believe has been committed; the grounds for believing that 
the device will afford evidence of the offence; and the means at law 
enforcement’s disposal to narrow the parameters of the search.  
As outlined above, the imposition of search protocols constraining 
the warranted search will foster meaningful review and it will help 
prevent overbroad searches before they happen. But Vu makes it clear 
that regardless of whether the issuing justice imposes ex ante restrictions, 
the police do not have the licence to rummage indiscriminately through 
all of the data on the device:  
By now it should be clear that my finding that a search protocol was 
not constitutionally required in this case does not mean that once police 
had the warrant in hand, they had a licence to scour the devices 
indiscriminately. They were bound, in their search, to adhere to the rule 
that the manner of the search must be reasonable. Thus, if, in the course 
of their search, the officers realized that there was in fact no reason to 
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supra, note 59, at para. 21; Hunter, supra, note 59, at 161. 
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search a particular program or file on the device, the law of search and 
seizure would require them not to do so.120 
Trial-level decisions have taken up this concept and the principles 
they have developed can be applied to the Fearon context and help foster 
meaningful review. First, in R. v. Sop, the accused was charged with two 
offences relating to child pornography.121 The police had obtained a 
warrant to seize and search the suspect’s electronic devices. There were 
no search protocols attached to the warrant.122 The police went on to 
scour 40 terabytes of data on multiple computers (which the court found 
was equivalent to an amount of paper that would “fill 14,000 pickup 
trucks”).123 The accused argued that the search was overbroad; the trial 
judge agreed and held that this approach violated the accused’s section 8 
rights. Although the warrant did not specify any search restrictions, the 
police were still bound by the reasonable manner requirement of section 8 
of the Charter. The police knew the file names and hash values of the 
child pornography files for which they were looking. But rather than 
begin the search using a targeted keyword search or a hash value search, 
the police manually combed through all of the data.124 They did so 
despite having the technological tools available to perform targeted 
searches. The Court wrote: 
There is no evidence before me that the police first tried to search by 
name, date or hash values. Depending on what the police found after 
these searches, they may have to apply different search techniques or 
apply for a new search warrant. 
Rather than try this approach the police combed through 40 TB of data 
which contained in addition to the alleged child pornography, adult 
pornography, lifestyle choices, sexual orientation, business travel, 
personal affairs and business affairs all of which would have been 
extremely private and sensitive information to the Applicant. 
..... 
Still from a search procedure point of view, one would have thought the 
police would have used the parameters they knew to try to narrow their 
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search and if they were unsuccessful they would have likely been 
justified doing a more invasive search. From the number of hours the 
police spent doing this search, it is almost unbelievable they wouldn't 
have tried to use the specific information they had to their advantage. 
If the police had been unable to locate the movies and photographs they 
knew about by doing different parameter searches they would have 
been authorized to continue looking by other methods … without 
further authorization. However, it appears to this court that the police 
simply wanted to do a general search of all 40 TB of storage space. 
Perhaps because of the amount of storage space they seized they 
thought they may have stumbled onto something much larger than the 
11 videos and 380 pictures that they knew had been downloaded.125 
The Court went on to exclude the unlawfully obtained evidence 
under section 24(2) of the Charter because the decision to “search every 
and each file in the accused’s vast computer system when they had very 
specific information about what they were looking for” was 
“unwarranted and somewhat egregious”.126 
In R. v. Nurse, two co-accused were charged with murder.127 The 
Crown’s theory was that Nurse hired the co-accused Plummer to carry 
out the killing. The police had grounds to believe that the two co-accused 
communicated with each other about their plot using their Blackberry 
devices. The OPP sent the devices to the RCMP to conduct a full “data 
dump” and analysis of every file on the devices. The Court held that this 
manner of search was unduly overbroad and a violation of section 8 of 
the Charter. The officers “should have realized that there was no reason 
to search all programs and files on the devices”.128 Because the relevant 
evidence consisted of recent communications between Nurse and 
Plummer, the search should have been limited to “BBM chats, SMS 
(texts), emails, notes, and call logs”.129 Searching the web browsing 
history, photographs and Internet cookies was unreasonable under the 
circumstances. 
Meaningful ex post manner-of-search review was possible in Sop  
and Nurse because there was a record detailing the extent of the search. 
The need for a comprehensive record of the search was top-of-mind for  
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the Fearon majority. Justice Cromwell suggested that one way to ensure 
meaningful review in the warrantless context is to require that officers 
“make detailed notes of what they have examined on the cell phone”.130 
Indeed, the majority writes that a requirement of detailed note-taking 
“should be imposed as a matter of constitutional imperative” because the 
Fearon exception involves an “extraordinary search power that requires 
neither a warrant nor reasonable and probable grounds”.131 
The majority includes only a single sentence explaining what 
“detailed notes” means in this context. These notes should “generally” 
include: (1) applications searched, (2) the extent of the search, (3) the 
time of the search and (4) its purpose and duration.132  
It will be necessary for the lower courts to flesh out these 
requirements. A bare requirement that officers “take detailed notes” 
pertaining to these four broad categories will not foster meaningful 
review.133 As any criminal lawyer can attest, a given officer’s idea of 
“detailed notes” will vary with the length of the police officer’s foot. 
Meaningful after-the-fact review in the warrantless search context 
requires more than “detailed notes”. It requires meticulously accurate and 
thoroughly complete records. Given the privacy interests at stake — and 
the attendant risks that the police’s searches could easily drift into fishing 
expeditions — the police should be able to account for every button they 
press and every keystroke they make on the digital device. Anything 
short of such a complete and accurate record will frustrate meaningful 
after-the-fact review.  
It would, of course, be cumbersome for police officers to manually 
record in their notebooks every keystroke they make while conducting the 
search. Many of these warrantless searches will take place on-scene — 
either roadside, as in Mr. Fearon’s case, or in some other inconvenient 
circumstance. Accordingly, unless and until the technology becomes 
available to create a digital log of the officer’s roadside search, courts ought 
to insist that officers make a video record of the search.  
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Electronic video recording will create a complete and accurate record 
and foster meaningful after-the-fact review. Knowing that defence 
counsel will have a video recording of their search will help to ensure 
that officers take seriously the requirement that warrantless searches be 
narrowly tailored and truly incidental to the arrest. It would have the 
desired effect of “helping police officers focus on the question of 
whether their conduct in relation to the phone falls squarely within the 
parameters of a lawful search incident to arrest”.134 The video recording 
requirement is also much less cumbersome and less time-consuming than 
requiring officers to capture the same information in their notes. 
The video recording of evidence is not a novel concept. In many 
jurisdictions, videography is routinely used to record crime scenes. It is 
also increasingly common for police to video record the execution of a 
search of a dwelling conducted pursuant to a warrant.135 It is also now 
routine for the police to electronically record interviews of suspects and 
witnesses.136 And increasingly, citizens and groups are calling for police 
officers’ entire interactions with members of the public to be video 
recorded (despite the impact on privacy).137 The Innocence Project 
identifies the video recording of interrogations as a key safeguard against 
false confessions.138 Video recording reduces the incidence of police 
misconduct. If interrogators know that their acts are being monitored, it 
is less likely that they will employ tactics that overstep their lawful 
authority. It will also make instances of misconduct easier to identify.  
In those situations, having an unassailable record of what happened — 
including the precise sequence of events — is invaluable. These same 
rationales for video recording evidence in the above-mentioned contexts 
apply with equal vigour to video recording of cell phone searches. Rifling 
through a suspect’s cell phone is a tempting proposition because it is  
so easy to do and because there are no witnesses. It is less tempting if  
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the officer knows that the search is being recorded. The knowledge that 
each keystroke is being electronically recorded will force the officer to 
carefully turn his mind to the legitimate goals of the search incident  
to arrest.  
A video record will help establish that the officer’s search remained 
moored to its purpose and did not stray into a fishing expedition. If the 
officer legitimately feared that the suspect had summoned his 
confederates for assistance (a scenario the Fearon majority 
contemplated), then reviewing the most recent text messages or e-mails 
or numbers dialed on the call log is arguably a reasonable search. 
Rummaging through older e-mails or reviewing the Internet browser 
history is not tailored to the purpose of ensuring officer safety.  
Still photography and screen shots of the cell phone search can be 
selective, but a video is an all-encompassing record of the search. 
Videography would capture not only the entire scope of the search, but 
also its sequence. Sequencing matters when it comes to assessing the 
reasonableness of the manner of search. There may be instances where it 
is permissible to look in less obvious places. A suspect is not necessarily 
going to store his incriminating documents in the “incriminating 
documents” folder. But one would expect that an officer, acting 
reasonably, would begin with the obvious places first and then move to 
the less obvious ones.139 An officer looking for a photograph of a gun 
should not begin with the Internet browser history. A video record would 
provide an objective baseline against which one could evaluate the 
reasonableness of the officer’s sequence of search. 
If a complete and accurate record of the search is preserved, then 
counsel will have the proper evidentiary foundation to challenge the 
manner of search. If the officer cannot articulate why they took a given 
step in conducting the warrantless search, then the search may be 
unreasonable and a violation of section 8. On the other hand, officers 
behaving properly will have video evidence to corroborate their 
testimony.  
                                                                                                                                  
139 The United States case law suggests that the police must follow the “obvious to obscure” 
approach when conducting computer searches as a way to ensure that searches do not become 
fishing expeditions. See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, at 1094 (10th Cir. 2009)  
(the police must “first look in the most obvious places and as it becomes necessary to progressively 
move from the obvious to the obscure”). This approach has been adopted in Sop, supra, note 121,  
at para. 145. 
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II. CONCLUSION 
The first five years of the Supreme Court of Canada’s digital-search-
and-seizure jurisprudence has been a mixed bag for privacy. The Court’s 
awareness of how computer and cell phone technologies affect privacy, 
and that these new realities should inform the scope of section 8 Charter 
rights is a welcome development. But these decisions deal primarily with 
only one aspect of section 8 — the warrant requirement. They do not 
fully address an equally important prophylactic rule of section 8 — that 
even lawful searches must be conducted in a reasonable manner.  
To strike the proper balance between law enforcement needs and 
privacy, searches conducted pursuant to a warrant must be appropriately 
constrained. It will be important to develop rules that constrain the 
manner of a computer search conducted pursuant to a computer search 
warrant. Going forward, courts ought to (and counsel ought to urge 
courts to) include “search protocols” in computer search warrants that 
will impose limits on how, where, when and for how long the police can 
search our electronic devices. 
The Court’s recent decision in Fearon poses a different but related 
set of challenges. Fearon permits a warrantless search of one’s computer 
device under the search-incident-to-arrest exception. Although the search 
power pursuant to this exception is limited, the potential for abuse is 
vast. The task of trial courts and of counsel is to ensure rigorous ex post 
review of warrantless cell phone searches. This will require precise 
record-keeping. Mere note-taking may not be enough. Courts ought to 
insist on the digital recording — either by way of video or other digital 
device — to ensure the best record of the search incident to arrest. Only 
such meticulous record-keeping will ensure meaningful ex post review of 
warrantless cell phone searches. 
